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The Euro: The Battle for the New Global Currency. By David Marsh (New Haven, CT and London: Yale 
University Press, 2011), xi + 386pp. £12.99/$20 paper. 
Where did deep political, economic and monetary integration in Europe come from? Integration has 
been a continuing attempt to resolǀe the ͚GerŵaŶ proďleŵ͛: iŶ esseŶĐe the struggle of other 
European countries to reach a lasting accommodation with their most powerful neighbour. 
In his fine book, David Marsh explains how the development of the euro can be understood in this 
context: as an attempt to constrain a reunified Germany. Participating in the single currency was the 
price Germany paid for to her partners for their support for reunification. But he concludes that the 
travails of the euro have now left Germany with the burden of a difficult choice. She can abandon 
the ĐurreŶĐy at the eĐoŶoŵiĐ Đost of a ͞ŵurderous reǀaluatioŶ͟ ;of ϭϬϬ per ĐeŶt iŶ the ǀieǁ of oŶe 
of Marsh͛s authoritatiǀe sourĐes!Ϳ, and at potentially great political cost. Or she can stay on board 
and assume the considerable financial burden of holding the project together. 
And there are other complications. A consistent theme of the book is that the German economy has 
played ďy the euro area͛s iŵpliĐit rules iŶ the seŶse that it has ĐoŶforŵed to the strictures of 
optiŵuŵ ĐurreŶĐy area theory. Its sluggish groǁth iŶ the euro͛s first deĐade geŶerated a fall iŶ the 
German real exchange rate that German workers bought with wage sacrifices. Other euro area 
countries have not managed to do the same, or – burdened by state bankruptcy, austerity, economic 
crises and political turmoil – cannot do so over a realistic timescale. Marsh concludes that this 
means the likely fragmentation of the euro area so that its membership scales down to a level at 
which its basic economics works, reflecting a necessary compatibility amongst euro countries. How 
this will happen and with what economic and political consequences is unknowable. 
So the big themes of the euro are well explained and with appropriate nuance. For example, in 
discussing the origins of the single currency in the 1990s, Marsh argues that although there was no 
explicit bargain over the euro and German reunification, without reunification Germany might not 
have agreed the timetable for the euro laid down at Maastricht. At the same time, German public 
anxiety over the surrender of the D-mark became a tool for imposing a German stamp on the shape 
of the euro͛s iŶstitutioŶal forŵs, ǁith the BuŶdesďaŶk adopted as the EuropeaŶ CeŶtral BaŶk͛s 
model of mandate. 
The unmatched strength of the book lies in its sources. Marsh has personally interviewed more than 
ninety individuals from a variety of countries many of whom were at the heart of the process that 
created the euro or have been intimately involved in its development to date. This work has 
produced some material of exceptional richness and constitutes a bedrock of serious scholarship 
from which no-one could fail to learn. 
Want to know why the Netherlands anchored its pre-euro ŵoŶetary poliĐy to GerŵaŶy͛s for so long? 
The Dutch finance minister for most of the 1980s explains. Want to know why Britain chose not to 
join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) upon its launch at the end of the 1970s? The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer at the time – Denis Healey – suggests that Britain had an America-before-Europe 
policy even then and it was this that chiefly informed the decision. Can there be a sympathetic 
readiŶg of BritaiŶ͛s paiŶful aŶd short-lived membership of the ERM that ended so ignominiously in 
1992? The architect of this policy – Prime Minister John Major – argues, not disinterestedly, that 
there ĐaŶ. The preseŶt reǀieǁer reŵaiŶs uŶĐoŶǀiŶĐed ďut the arguŵeŶt aŶd Marsh͛s geŶeral 
handling of this episode I found fascinating. Want to know how the French viewed the trade off 
between German reunification and the agreement of the euro timetable? The French Prime Minister 
at the time gives us his view. How did the Italians reconcile the tension between the loss of an 
independent exchange rate that could leave Italian industry uncompetitive against low-cost 
producers in Germany and the promise of European-level sovereignty that a seat at the euro table 
would give them? Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy in the 1990s and later President of the 
European Commission, provides some background. These are just a few particularly interesting 
examples; there are many more skilfully woven into the narrative, providing context and depth of 
explanation. 
The book adopts an historical perspective and for the most part the elements of monetary 
integration that pre-date the euro are well handled. However, on occasion, the analysis omits what 
might have been potentially illuminating issues. For example, the discussion of the Bretton Woods 
system might have referenced the Triffin Dilemma and the likely consequences of a fixed system 
that developed without an adjustment mechanism, particularly as these problems informed some 
later innovations in, for example, the ERM. 
Ultimately though, these are quibbles. This is a hugely impressive work that deserves to become a 
standard reference on the genesis and chequered development of the euro. 
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